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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REGULATION 
OF ADVERTISING 
Earl W. Kintner* 
T HE success of an economic democracy, no less than that of a political democracy, depends upon informed, intelligent choice. 
Thus, the widespread dissemination of information with respect to 
alternatives is imperative; otherwise, choices would be made in a 
vacuum and would become meaningless, if not plainly capricious. 
However, there is no paucity of information in our contemporary 
society; the so-called "mass media" ensure that. Indeed, modern man 
can hardly escape, even if he should so desire, the constant bombard-
ment of information from television, radio, newspapers, billboards, 
and other sources. 
Since in our society consumer choice is afforded the function of 
governing what goods are to be produced and who is to produce 
them,1 it is natural and desirable that various manufacturers should 
compete through the mass media for the buyers' attention. By this 
means the consumer is acquainted with the vast variety and the. rela-
tive merits and demerits of the goods and services available to him. 
The information thus obtained forms the basis for each individual's 
decision as to how to spend his paycheck. The cumulative effect of 
the choices of all such consumers is to determine what goods will 
be produced, what services will be performed and who will produce 
or perform them, since an article that does not sell will no longer 
be produced. Thus, the buyer gets the merchandise he wants, and 
the producer who is able and willing to provide it at a price and of 
a quality satisfactory to the consumer is successful. 
A function so vital and so profitable as the dissemination of in-
formation intended to guide consumer choice cannot be performed 
fortuitously. Consumer acquaintance and persuasion is a matter of 
life or death to a producer. It is therefore only natural that special-
ized assistance was obtained relative to the marketing aspect of pro-
duction, as it was with respect to such fields as research and develop-
ment and manufacturing techniques.2 In the process of responding 
• Member of the Indiana and District of Columbia Bars. Mr. Kintner is a former 
General Counsel and Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.-Ed. 
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to his colleague, Professor Bernie R. 
Burrus of the Georgetown University Law Center, for valuable assistance in the prep-
aration of this article. 
1. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 38 (2d ed. 1951). 
2. See generally SIMON, THE LAW FOR ADVERTISING AND MARKETING (1956); TURNER, 
THE SHOCKING HlsTORY OF ADVERTISING (1953). 
[ 1269] 
1270 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:1269 
to the need for expert guidance in acquainting the consumer with 
products and persuading him in his economic choices, advertising 
has mushroomed into a twelve billion dollar per year industry3 per-
forming a service that is imperative to our free economy. Through 
the mass communications media the advertiser provides the con-
sumer the information with which he can make his economic choices 
intelligently and meaningfully, and thus causes economic democracy 
to be viable in practice as well as appealing in theory. 
However, information qua information is not sufficient to sustain 
an economic democracy. If "a little information is dangerous," mis-
information can be disastrous. For example, when goods are praised 
to the point of untruth, or a competitor's goods are falsely disparaged 
and the competitor then replies in kind, the result is not informed, 
intelligent choice, but rather its perversion; there is no "choice" 
when selection is a function of competing untruths, deceits, and mis-
leading comparisons. Production is no longer regulated by consumer 
choice, and business success is no longer measured by consµmer satis-
faction. Moreover, the use of such deceptive techniques is not un-
common in the advertising field. The profit motive can be a pow-
erful inducement to the destruction of principle, and control over 
consumer choice is a tremendous weapon in the arsenal of the un-
principled. 
The valuable service performed by advertising for our American 
system of free enterprise and the part advertising has played in pro-
ducing the highest standard of living ever achieved in the history of 
the world cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the power possessed by 
advertisers in the "battle for men's minds," as illustrated by their 
ability to influence the direction of our economic development, car-
ries certain responsibilities with its use. I have described these re-
sponsibilities elsewhere in terms of a set of "social obligations" of 
advertisers.4 The essence of these obligations is quite simply to 
3. Madntyre, FTC Promotes Confidence in Advertising, p. 4-, Address Before the 
Better Business Division, Miami-Dade County Chamber of Commerce, July 18, 1963. 
4-. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 168-69 (1964): "A summary definition of the 
social responsibilities of advertising would, at a minimum, embrace these three ele• 
ments: 
I. To function as an efficient instrument of free and fair competition by focus-
ing public attention on the demonstrable merits of competing products and scr• 
vices. 
2. To foster innovation by affording new entrants to the market place an effi• 
cient means of winning public acceptance. 
3. To furnish to consumers the information necessary for intelligent choices. 
"These responsibilities are affirmatively stated. Viewing them negatively, we may 
state the summary in this way: 
I. To avoid perverting free competition by using advertising as an unfair 
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"speak the truth," which means more than merely to avoid speaking 
half-truths; the advertiser must include all the facts that are essential 
to the formation of an accurate judgment concerning the qualities 
of the article or services described. 
Most advertisers embrace the obligation faithfully, and through 
such groups as the American Association of Advertising Agencies 
have established codes embodying standards of truthfulness and good 
taste for their own governance.5 However, self-regulation, as salutary 
and necessary as it is, cannot perform the whole task of meeting the 
social responsibilities of the advertising industry. There are jackals 
on the fringes of advertising, as there are on the fringes of any other 
industry, in whose ethic social responsibility takes a back seat, if it 
is not, in fact, left on the curbstone. Positive law and its sanctions are 
required to ensure that the truth will be spoken, thereby protecting 
the honest advertiser and providing the consumer with the basis nec-
essary for an intelligent choice. 
I. THE ORIGIN OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF ADVERTISING 
The need for governmental regulation of advertising became 
apparent early in this century, when the rapid growth of communi-
cations and transportation provided the ~eans for the widespread 
distribution of goods and services and thus fostered the development 
of a new technique in marketing. It had become feasible to market 
a brand-name product on a national basis, since the advances in 
transportation permitted inexpensive distribution of goods from a 
central location. In addition, the tremendous growth of the publish-
ing media, coinciding with the high rate of national literacy, meant 
method of competition. Disparagement of worthy competitors or the diversion of 
sales through deception are obvious examples of foul competition. 
2. To avoid the use of deception or the exercise of market power to stifle in-
novation. Advertising can be used as a tool of monopoly, just as it can be used as 
an instrument of free competition. 
3. To avoid flooding consumers with false and misleading statements which 
pervert the right of free choice. The economic damage to consumers produced by 
such practices is vicious; the weakening of public confidence in a free enterprise 
economy resulting from such practices is a far greater vice." 
5. In its Creative Code, published in 1962, the Association described its guidelines 
thus: 
Therefore, we, the members of the American Association of Advertising Agen-
cies, in addition to supporting and obeying the laws and legal regulations pertain• 
ing to advertising, undertake to extend and broaden the application of high ethical 
standards. Specifically we will not knowingly produce advertising which contains: 
a. False or misleading statements or exaggerations, visual or verbal. 
b. Testimonials which do not reflect the real choice of a competent witness. 
c. Price claims which are misleading. 
d. Comparisons which unfairly disparage a competitive product or service. 
e. Claims insufficiently supported, or which distort the true meaning or prac-
ticable application of statements made by professional or scientific authority. 
f. Statements, suggestions or pictures offensive to public decency. 
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that it had become possible to create a widespread consciousness of 
a brand name through national advertising. 
Unfortunately, among the first to recognize and exploit the new 
marketing technique was a horde of° quacks.6 The country became 
saturated with extravagant claims made on behalf of patent medi-
cines and healing services. Soon manufacturers of soaps, cereals, 
cough drops, and canned milk all joined the ranks of nationwide 
advertisers and distributors. As the impact of advertising multiplied 
throughout the nation, the dangers that false and misleading claims 
held for consumers and honest competitors became evident.7 
Journalists, doctors, and advertising men who were concerned 
with the future of advertising contributed to the exposure and con-
demnation of the untruthful claims of the quacks. Samuel Hopkins 
Adams made a monumental contribution through his famed series 
of articles on patent medicines that appeared in Collier's in 1906.8 
In 1911 the American Medical Association began its series entitled 
Nostrums and Quackery, and Printers' Ink launched a drive for the 
adoption of a model state statute prohibiting false and misleading 
advertising. Under the active sponsorship of the Associated Adver-
tising Clubs of the,World and the Better Business Bureaus, false ad-
vertising statutes were passed in forty-four states. Finally, the federal 
government also moved against false and misleading advertising,0 
although federal action did not take the form of a direct prohibition 
against deceptive advertising with criminal penalties for violations. 
The federal effort began with the establishment of the Federal Trade 
Commission in 1914. 
As originally enacted, the Federal Trade Commission Act was 
6. See HOLBROOK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF QUACKERY (1959). 
7. The common law afforded no relief to the problem. See Weston, Deceptive Ad· 
vertising and the Federal Trade Commission: Decline of Caveat Emptor, 24 FED, B.J. 
548, 550 (1964): 
1. The Inadequacy of Common Law. American lawyers are prone to take pride 
in the Anglo-American common law tradition, attributing to it the virtue of flexi• 
bility and growth to meet the necessities of the times. But by not providing effec-
tive remedies against false advertising, the common law dismally failed to keep up 
with modem conditions. The ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the rigid require• 
ments for proof of such elements as scienter and materiality of misre_Presentations, 
stringent doctrines of privity and broad privileges of "puffing," combined with the 
disproportionately-high costs of litigation to destroy any hope of effective con• 
sumer remedies. Actions by competitors against false advertisers were likewise 
confined to exceptionally limited circumstances because of fear of flooding the 
courts with litigation despite judicial admission that such conduct was "morally 
wrong and improper." 
8. The first fruit of this effort was the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ll4 Stat, 
769. 
9. The Food and Drug Act was of limited application, its principal protection 
being the requirement of the correct description of the contents of a medicinal prod• 
uct on the package. 
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not intended to deal with the problem of false advertising. Rather, 
the early proponents of the act were interested in the efficient en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. The "rule of reason" and tjle appar-
ent hostility of the courts to the Sherman Act10 had led men like 
Louis Brandeis to seek a new approach to the enforcement of the 
antitrust laws. An administrative agency was thought to be in order, 
and President Wilson vigorously supported the proposal for a trade 
commission. In 1914 the Federal Trade Commission Act was finally 
passed, containing in section 5 this basic prohibition: "[U]nfair 
methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful."11 
The language employed in section 5 suggested to many that the 
prohibition was limited to the enforcement of the antimonopoly 
policy of the federal government.12 As was stated in the first defini-
tive treatise on the Federal Trade Commission, the FTC's jurisdic- · 
tion over advertising was a "fortuitous byproduct."13 If Congress 
had been concerned with the problem of false advertising, the author 
of the treatise suggested, it would have passed a different type of stat-
ute with a different procedural and regulatory scheme. It has also 
been noted that "the regulatory scheme envisioned in the FTC Act 
for the slower-paced antitrust problem was not ideally suited for the 
faster moving advertising field, in which speed in enforcement might 
become of the essence."14 This restrictive· approach was vigorously 
challenged. Those favoring a broad interpretation of the Commis-
sion's power argued that the boundaries of the statutory prohibition 
had been deliberately left undefined by the sponsors of the act. Mr. 
Justice Brandeis explained the basic theory of the proponents of a 
broad interpretation as follows: 
Instead of undertaking to define what practices should be 
deemed unfair as had been done in earlier legislation, the act 
left the determination to the commission. Experience with ex-
isting laws had taught that definition, being necessarily rigid, 
would prove embarrassing, and, if rigorously applied, might in-
volve great hardship. Methods of competition which would be 
10. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
11. 38 Stat. 719 (1914). 
12. Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 CoLuM. L. 
REv. 439, 450 (1964). Mr. Millstein, in fact, asserts that "the most important develop• 
ment in the long history of the ITC's prohibition of false advertising was that the 
ITC concerned itself with the problem in the first place." Ibid. See also Austern, 
The Parentage and Administrative Ontogeny. of the Federal Trade Commission, in 
1955 N.Y.S.B.A. ANTITRUST I.Aw SYMPOSIUM 83; Baker & Baum, Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 ,VII.L. L. REv. 517 
(1962); Rublee, The Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade Commission, 
11 ACADEMY PoLrrICAL ScIENCE PROCEEDINGS 666 (1926). 
13. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 339 (1924). 
14. Millstein, supra note 12, at 451. · 
1274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:1269 
unfair in one industry, under certain circumstances, might, 
when adopted in another industry, or even in the same industry 
under different circumstances, be entirely unobjectionable. 
Furthermore, an enumeration, however comprehensive, of 
existing methods of unfair competition must necessarily soon 
prove incomplete, as with new conditions constantly arising 
novel unfair methods would be devised and developed.10 
Whatever the view held by the sponsors of the original act may 
have been, the first few Federal Trade Commissioners almost imme-
diately concerned themselves with false advertising.16 The first two 
cease-and-desist orders issued by the Commission proscribed certain 
false and misleading advertising practices.17 The Commission's first 
formal order proscribing the deceptive advertising of a drug was 
issued in 1918.18 Moreover, the first Commission order reviewed by 
a court involved the false advertising of food,19 and as early as 1922 
the United States Supreme Court approved a Commission order to 
cease and desist from deceptive advertising.20 It has been estimated 
that as early as 1925 orders directed against false and misleading ad-
vertising constituted seventy-five per cent of all orders issued by the 
Commission each year. 
It is interesting to note that the Commission's jurisdiction over 
false advertising became indisputable during a period in which those 
Commission functions most desire.d by the proponents of a trade 
commission-the antimonopoly powers-were being thwarted by ju-
dicial hostility. Thus, while only forty-three Commission orders out 
of a total of eighty-two reviewed on their merits by the courts up 
until 1931 were either entirely or substantially upheld, twenty-two 
15. FTC v. Gratz, 273 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1920) (dissenting opinion). 
16. In the Second Annual Report, members of the Commission stated: "The Com-
mission has made no attempt to define what methods of competition are 'unfair' so 
that 'a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public.' 
Unfair competition, like 'fraud,' 'due care,' 'unjust discrimination,' and many other 
familiar concepts in the law, is incapable of exact definition, but its underlying prin-
ciple is clear-a principle sufficiently elastic to cover all future unconscionable com-
petitive practices in whatever form they may appear, provided they sufficiently affect 
the public interest. Thus far the Commission has been of the opinion that at least 
those cases in which the method of competition restrains trade, substantially lessens 
competition, or tends to create a monopoly are subject to a proceeding under section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Commission has gone further than this, 
however, and in some instances where these elements did not appear, as in certain 
cases of misbranding and falsely advertising the character of goods where the public 
was particularly liable to be misled, the Commission has taken jurisdiction." 1916 FTC 
Arm. REP. 6. (Emphasis added.) 
17. Circle Cilk Co., I F.T.C. 13 (1916); A. Theo. Abbott &: Co., I F.T.C. 16 (1916). 
18. Block &: Co., 1 F.T.C. 154 (1918). 
19. Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307 (7th Cir. 1919). 
20. FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483 (1922). 
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of the twenty-nine FTC orders concerning false advertising reviewed 
by the courts in the same period were upheld.21 
II. THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT POWERS 
Although Commission jurisdiction over false advertising was es-
tablished beyond doubt, one important question remained unre-
solved. The statute proscribed "unfair methods of competition." 
Commission action was clearly authorized when a company was in-
jured by the false or misleading advertising of a competitor; but did 
the Commission have jurisdiction to proceed against advertising 
which was misleadipg to the public when it could not be shown that 
there had been an injury to a competing company? For the Commis-
sion to serve as a guardian of the informed, intelligent choice which, 
as has been suggested, is imperative to our economic order, the an-
swer to this question would have to be in the affirmative. No answer 
was provided by the twenty-nine cases prior to 1931 in which Com-
mission cease-and-desist orders were reviewed.22 In none of the twenty-
two cases in which an order of the Commission had been upheld was 
the decision specifically grounded upon a finding that honest com-
petition had been injured by the proscribed advertising. On the 
other hand, in at least one of the cases in which the Commission 
was reversed, the order was set aside on the ground that the mis-
representation had no tendency to injure competition.23 
In the famous case of FTC v. Raladam Co.,24 the Supreme Court 
was squarely confronted with the issue whether it was necessary to 
show, as a prerequisite to FTC jurisdiction to take action against 
a false advertising practice, that the practice had an adverse effect on 
competition. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the Com-
mission was without jurisdiction to issue an order prohibiting false 
advertising absent proof that the advertisement affected competitors, 
even though the advertisement admittedly deceived the public. The 
Raladam decision struck a hard blow because it not only limited the 
scope of FTC enforcement powers, but also attacked the very base 
of economic democracy. It was only natural that agitation soon de-
veloped for congressional action to broaden the FTC's power to en-
able the Commission to protect the consuming public as well as hon-
21. See Handler, Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over False Adver-
tising, 31 CoLUM. L. REv. 527, 539 (1931). 
22. Ibid. 
23. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929). 
24. 283 U.S. 643 (1931). 
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est competitors. The fruit of this agitation was the passage in 1938 
of the Wheeler-Lea amendments to the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. Section 5 of the act now reads: "Unfair methods of competition 
in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, 
are hereby declared unlawful."25 By the addition of the italicized lan-
guage, the previous emphasis on protection of competition was aban-
doned, and the Commission was granted a broader basis from which 
to police false advertisers. "Thus, the necessity for alleging injury 
to competition was removed and attention was focused on the detri-
ment to the consumer occasioned by advertising misrepresenta-
tions."26 That the Commission was to have a role in guaranteeing 
informed and intelligent consumer choice was confirmed by Senator 
Wheeler, a co-author of the amendment, who said: "Broadly speak-
ing, this legislation is designed to give the Federal Trade Commis-
sion jurisdiction over unfair acts and practices for consumer protec-
tion to the same extent that it now has jurisdiction over unfair 
methods of competition for the protection of competitors."27 
The 1938 amendments also enlarged the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act by adding section 12,28 which declares certain advertise-
ments of foods, drugs, medical devices, and cosmetics to be "unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce" within the meaning of 
section 5,29 and by providing important new procedural weapons for 
25. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). (Emphasis added.) It was still essential 
that the deceptive act have been committed in commerce-that is, by a competitor 
rather than by a commentator or someone else not in the business. Compare Penna• 
Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941), with Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 
640 ·(3d Cir. 1941). That this amendment filled the gap left by the decision in Raladam 
was pointed out in Pep Boys-Manny, Moe &: Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d 
Cir. 1941), where the court stated: 
The failure to mention competition in the latter phrase ["unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in commerce'1 shows a legislative intent to remove the procedural 
requirement set up in the Raladam case and the Commission can now center its 
attention on the direct protection of the consumer where formerly it could protect 
him only indirectly through the protection of the competitor. The logic of the 
present trend of the law is apparent when we realize how helpless the Commission 
would be under the rule of the Raladam case where all the competitors in the 
industry were using the same practice or where the offender had a monopoly in 
a field which did not compete with any other field. 
See also Rothschild v. FTC, 200 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 
(1953); Globe Cardboard Novelty Co., Inc. v. FTC, 192 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1951). See 
generally OPPENHEIM, CAsES ON UNFAIR TRADE PMcrICES 372-74 (2d ed. 1965). 
26. Note, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 1018, 1022 (1956). 
27. 83 CoNG. REc. 3256 (1938). 
28. 52 Stat. 114 (1938), adding 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1964). 
29. A dual enforcement system was envisioned with respect to food, drugs, cos-
metics, and medical devices. Thus, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (52 
Stat 1040-59 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§ 309-92 (1964)) vested concurrent jurisdiction over 
these items in the Food and Drug Administration. That the resulting opportunity for 
dual enforcement was intentional is shown by statements of Senator Lea. Sec 83 
CONG. REc. 410 (1938). 
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the Commission's use in its war on false advertising. The Commis-
sion's effectiveness had previously been hampered by a lack of effec-
tive penalties and by the delay involved in actually accomplishing a 
termination of the misleading practices whenever the advertiser in-
sisted upon contesting the Commission's action. To remedy this situ-
ation, the 1938 amendments added the following three procedures 
and penalties, of which the last two apply only in cases involving 
food, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics. 
I. If no court review is sought within sixty days of a Commission 
order to cease and desist, the order becomes final; violation of a final 
order results in a civil penalty of up to fifty thousand dollars for each 
violation. 
2. Where the advertisement is likely to induce the purchase of 
a commodity which is injurious to health or where there is intent to 
defraud, a criminal proceeding may be instituted, with fines up to 
five thousand dollars and imprisonment up to six months.80 
3. The Commission may require a temporary injunction against 
the dissemination of false information about foods, drugs, medical 
devices, and cosmetics, pending a final determination by _the Com-
mission and subsequent court review.81 , 
Congressional action in the false-advertising field did not end 
with the Wheeler-Lea amendments. In 1939 Congress passed the 
Wool Products Labeling Act,82 an enactment which substantially en-
larged Commission authority to proceed against the false advertising 
of wool products sold in interstate commerce. Modeled upon the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Wool Act prohibited the intro-
duction, the manufacture for introduction into interstate commerce, 
and the sale, transportation, or distripution in interstate commerce 
of a wool product which is "misbranded" in that it does not bear a 
label as required by the act or bears a false label.33 The required 
label must remain affixed to the product until it is sold to the con-
sumer.84 "Cease and desist order proceedings, authority t~ obtain tem-
porary injunctions in the district courts, criminal prosecution and 
product seizure and condemnation suits in the Federal district courts 
30. 52 Stat. ll5 (1938), adding 15 U.S.C. § 54 (1964). 
31. 52 Stat. ll5 (1938), adding 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1964). 
32. 54 Stat. ll29 (1940), adding 15 U.S.C. §§ 68-68j (1964). 
33. "Informative labeling of manufactured wool products to indicate percentage of 
wool and other fibers, disclosure of the use of reprocessed or reused wool and of load-
ing, filling or adulterating matter was specifically required and the name or registered 
identification number of the manufacturer must also appear on the label." Weston, 
supra note 7, at 552. 
34. See FTC, Rules and Regulations Under Wool Products Labeling Act, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 300.5 (1960). 
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were provided for enforcement of this Act. "36 In addition, Congress 
in 1950 amended section 15 of the FTC Act to provide that adver-
tisements of margarine are to be deemed misleading in a material 
respect if "representations are made or suggested that such oleomar-
garine or margarine is a dairy product."36 A provision of general sig-
nificance in the same amendment substantially strengthened the 
FTC cease-and-desist order by stating that a separate violation could 
be found for each day the violation of a final order continued; the 
penalty for each such violation could be a fine of as much as five 
thousand dollars. 
The success of the Wool Act, together with the existence of wide-
spread misrepresentations in the labeling of fur products, led to the 
Fur Products Labeling Act of 1951.37 This act prohibited the false 
advertising of fur products and required informative advertising in 
addition to informative labeling.38 The Flammable Fabrics Act,80 
passed in 1953, authorized the Commission to protect the consumer 
from fabrics and wearing apparel with flammability exceeding pre-
scribed limits. Finally, in 1958 Congress enacted the most compre-
hensive of all the specialized product statutes enforced by the Com-
mission, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act,40 which re-
quires informative advertising as well as informative labeling and 
applies extensively to retail activities involving products that have 
been shipped in interstate commerce. Enforcement is provided by 
the typical means: cease-and-desist orders, product seizures, criminal 
prosecutions, and temporary injunctions. 
It is thus readily apparent that Commission authority to elim-
inate deception and to provide consumers with the information 
necessary to make intelligent choices among competing goods has 
changed considerably since 1914. General legislation, such as the 
Wheeler-Lea amendments to section 5 of the FTC Act and the pen-
alty provisions added to that act in 1950, has provided a wider juris-
dictional basis and broader enforcement powers for Commission ac-
tion. Moreover, specialized legislation with respect to such products 
as food, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, oleomargarine, and wool 
and fur products has served to make the definition of deceptive ad-
vertising with respect to those goods more specific and, therefore, to 
make violations of section 5 relative to such products more easily 
35. Weston, supra note 7, at 552. 
36. 64 Stat. 21 (1950), amending 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(2) (1964). 
37. 65 Stat. 175 (1951), adding 15 U.S.C. §§ 69-69j (1964). 
38. 65 Stat. 178 (1951), adding 15 U.S.C. § 69(c) (1964). 
39. 67 Stat. lll (1953), adding 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1200 (1964), 
40. 72 Stat. l717 (1958), adding 15 U.S.C. §§ 70-70k (1964). 
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discovered and prosecuted. The Commission's response to the chal-
lenge posed by the misuse of modern advertising techniques has 
been well described by Professor Handler: 
Through its outlawing of unfair and deceptive acts the 
Commission has rendered yeoman service in raising the plane of 
competition. Efforts to curb false and misleading advertising 
had foundered before the Commission undertook the vigilant 
protection of the consumer and the honest businessman. It is 
here the Commission has made its most notable contributions 
to substantive doctrine. To be sure, the market place has not 
been purged of all improprieties, but recent decades have wit-
nessed an impressive elevation of business standards.41 
III. TYPICAL PATTERNS OF DECEPTION 
Because of the thousands of cases which have been decided in the 
half-century since the creation of the Federal Trade Commission, 
businessmen and their advertisers should have few doubts about 
what kind of advertising can legally be shown on television or pic-
tured in print. The range of advertising permitted by these decisions 
presents a field of endeavor for the advertiser which is both wide 
and fertile. Yet in this savagely competitive business, ingenuity and 
craftiness still frequently lead to illegality. The line between the le-
gally permissible and impermissible is, of course, not drawn with 
specificity in the statute. Recognizing that the very ingenuity and 
craftiness inherent in the advertising business precluded this ap-
proach, Congress couched the law in broad language such as· "unfair 
methods of competition and ... unfair or deceptive practices," and 
left it up to the Commission to apply the intent of the law to spe-
cific acts and practices as they came into being. Such flexibility was 
the only practical means of dealing with future chicanery. Neverthe-
less, the many Commission decisions over the years do provide some 
specific guidelines which separate permissible from impermissible 
advertising practices. Many of the cases fall into recognizable pat-
terns of deceptive techniques; these patterns consist of a few basic 
schemes which have been applied in several 'diverse factual settings. 
The more typical categories of deceptive practices will be discussed 
below in an effort to afford some insight into the ways that the Com-
mission has proceeded in protecting consumers against false adver-
tising and, at the same time, to suggest guidelines concerning what 
the advertisers may and may not do. 
Before considering the specific patterns of deceptive techniques 
41. Handler, Introduction to Symposium-The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal 
Trade Commission, 64 CoLuM. L. REv. 385, 388 (1964). 
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which have developed over the years, attention should be focused 
upon certain basic rules which govern all advertising. These may be 
summarized as follows: 
I. Tendency to deceive. The Commission is empowered to act 
when representations have only a tendency to mislead or deceive.42 
Proof of actual deception is not essential,48 although evidence of ac-
tual deception is apparently conclusive as to the deceptive quality of 
the advertisement in question. 
2. Immateriality of knowledge of falsity. Since the purpose of 
the FTC Act is consumer protection, the Government does not have 
to prove knowledge of falsity on the part of the advertiser;44 the busi-
nessman acts at his own peril. 
3. Immateriality of intent. The intent of the advertiser is also 
entirely immaterial. An advertiser may have a wholly innocent in-
tent and still violate the law.45 
4. General public's understanding controls. Since the purpose 
of the act is to protect the consumer, and since some consumers are 
"ignorant, unthinking and credulous,"46 nothing less than "the most 
literal truthfulness" is tolerated.47 As the Supreme Court has stated, 
"laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious."48 
Thus it is immaterial that an expert reader might be able to deci-
pher the advertisement in question so as to avoid being misled. 
5. Literal truth sometimes insufficient. Advertisements are not 
intended to be carefully dissected with a dictionary at hand, but 
rather are intended to produce an overall impression on the ordi-
nary purchaser.49 An advertiser cannot present one overall impres-
sion and yet protect himself by pointing to a contrary impression 
which appears in a small and inconspicuous portion of the advertise-
ment. Even though every sentence considered separately is true, the 
advertisement as a whole may be misleading because factors are 
omitted which should be mentioned, or because the message is com-
posed in such a way as to mislead. 50 
6. Ambiguous advertisements interpreted to effect purposes of 
the law. Since the purpose of the FTC Act is the prohibition of ad-
vertising which has a tendency and capacity to mislead, an advertise-
42. E.g., S. Buchsbaum &: Co. v. ITC, 160 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1947). 
43. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. ITC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). 
44. D.D.D. Corp. v. ITC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942). 
45. Bockensette v. ITC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943). 
46. Moretrench Corp. v. ITC, 127 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1942). 
47. Ibid. 
48. ITC v. Standarst Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937). 
49. Aronberg v. ITC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942). 
50. Kalwajtys v. ITC, 237 F.2d 654, 656 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957). 
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ment which can be read to have two meanings is illegal if one of 
them is false or misleading. 51 
The basic ground rules of all advertising have been indicated; 
it is now appropriate to examine the typical categories of deceptive 
practices. Although limitations of space preclude detailed coverage, 
enough will be said to suggest the basic substantive areas in which . 
the Commission has acted to protect" consumer choice. 
I. Deceptive pricing. This practice may take many forms. Ex-
amples include representations that an article may be purchased at 
a reduction from an established price, representations that an article 
may be purchased at "wholesale" or "factory" prices, representations 
that two products may be purchased for the price of one, and pre-
ticketing. 52 In each of these situations the consumer is obviously led 
to believe that he is buying the merchandise at a discount. If in fact 
no such discount exists--for example, if the "regular" price is never 
charged-the consumer is misled and trade is diverted illegally. 
"Bait-and-switch" advertising and offers of "free" goods are other 
manifestations of the same basic deceit. The essence of the ''bait-
and-switch" promotion is the attempt to switch the consumer's atten-
tion from the advertised product to a product which the baiter ac-
tually wants to sell. With regard to offers of "free" goods, the scheme 
is to require the consumer to purchase certain merchandise in order 
to obtain the free article. In either case, consumer deception and 
the diversion of trade are obvious and both techniques have been 
so attacked by the Commission. 53 
2. Deception by nondisclosure. The cases in this area are myriad 
and cover almost every variety of nondisclosure. Examples include 
the publishing of "abridged" or "condensed" books and the distri-
bution of "rebuilt" or "second-hand" goods without specifying either 
type of product as such. 54 Another example is the sale of foreign-
made goods without disclosing their origin when there is a consumer 
preference for domestic goods. Consumer deception is obvious, and 
the Commission has acted accordingly.55 
3. Product or name simulation. The intention here involved is 
51. Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other 
grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955). 
52. E.g., Rayex Corp. v. FTC, 317 F.2d 290 (2d Cir. 1963); Thomas v. FTC, 116 
F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1940); Del Mar Sewing Machine Co., 49 F.T.C. 1257 (1953); Ideal 
Mail Order Co., 43 F.T.C. 447 (1947). 
53. E.g., Del Mar Sewing Machine Co., supra note 52. As regards "free" goods, see 
Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1964); 13 Fed. Reg. 414 (1948); 
SIMON, ADVERTISING AND MARKETING 358-64 (1956). 
54. E.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1960). 
55. E.g., L. Heller &: Son, Inc. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951). 
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to market a product by using as one's own the name of another man-
ufacturer which has some degree of consumer acceptance. Such a 
technique clearly generates consumer confusion; the advertising is 
thus false and misleading within the meaning of section 5.Go The 
law of patents, trademarks, and copyrights protects a brand name 
from direct copying. The protection afforded by section 5 is broader, 
since illegality under that section does not depend upon the precise, 
literal copying of a name; it is sufficient if the name of the new 
product is close enough to that of an established product to deceive 
the prospective consumer. 
4. False disparagement of competing products. Attempting to 
sell one's own goods by disparaging those of a competitor is clearly 
an "unfair and deceptive act" within the Commission's purview. 
Thus, questions such as "Did you ever find maggots in your alumi-
num pans?" and "Do you know that aluminum pans may be full of 
the most deadly bacteria known to science?" distributed by a manu-
facturer of stainless steel cooking utensils were enjoined by the Com-
mission as unfair and deceptive practices. 57 
5. False representations of approval or sponsorship. Endorse-
ments by "doctors" or "dentists" or "scientific experts" are examples 
of this technique. Consumers tend to be persuaded by testimonials 
or sponsorship given by people who are "in a position to know." If 
the sponsorship is faked or rigged, the consumer is obviously misled 
and trade is diverted illegally. 58 
6. Guarantees. The word "guaranteed" used in connection with 
the sale of a product may .be misleading in suggesting to the pur-
chaser that the seller stands unconditionally behind his product, 
when in reality hidden conditions or interpretations may persist 
which make the "guarantee" meaningless. For example, if a tire is 
guaranteed "for life" and the undisclosed intention of the advertiser 
is that the. life referred to is that of the tire, the guarantee is useless 
and, because of its deception of the consumer and misdirection of 
trade, illegal. 59 
7. False representations of composition, character, or source. 
The violation here involved is that of representing an article as con-
taining certain desired ingredients, as being of a certain desired qual-
ity or composition, or as having a certain preferred origin when in 
fact none of these is the case. For example, where white pine is pre-
56. E.g., Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945), 
57. Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941). 
58. See, e.g., Adolph Kastor & Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 138 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1943). 
59. See generally Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1946); Hearst 
Magazines, Inc., 32 F.T.C. 1440 (1941). 
May 1966] FTC Regulation of Advertising 1283 
fen:ed by customers because of its superior durability, to call one's 
pine "white" when in fact it is "yellow" is to mislead the buyer and 
thus is a violation of the act.60 Other examples include suggestions 
that a product "restores natural moisture necessary for a live healthy 
skin" when such a claim is untrue, 61 and the use of "Havana" labels 
on cigars which are actually made from domestic tobacco.62 
8. Deceptive television demonstrations. "Mock-ups," or visual 
representations of the product or some other object which is not the 
product itself, are not illegal per se. Substitution of a facsimile for 
the actual product may be necessary where the technical require-
ments of the advertising medium prevent the use of the actual ob-
ject. For instance, real ice cream used in an advertisement will melt 
under the hot television lights and present to the public a particu-
larly unappetizing spectacle. To avoid this, advertisers may use a 
mock-up that looks like ice cream but does not melt during the com-
mercial. If, on the other hand, the demonstration represents that a 
product is doing something which it cannot do or that it has quali-
ties which it does not in fact possess, the practice contains a clear 
possibility of deception and is illegal. An illustration is the famous 
"sandpaper" shaving demonstration. The advertiser claimed that its 
shaving cream possessed a "super moisturizing" power so great that 
the cream could be used to shave sandpaper. Actual sandpaper was 
not used in the demonstration, but rather a "mock-up" of loose sand 
spread on plexiglass. Since ordinary sandpaper had to soak for an 
hour before it could be shaved, the shaving cream did not have the 
properties which the demonstration claimed. The practice was there-
fore enjoined.63 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The FTC does not, of course, work alone in providing a frame-
work in which informed, intelligent consumer choice can regulate 
the production and distribution of goods and services in our society. 
Other federal agencies and departments, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration, the Post Office Department, the Federal Commu-
60. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934). 
61. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944). 
62. El Moro Cigar Co. v. FTC, 107 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1939). 
63. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 310 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1962), on rehearing, 326 
F.2d 517 (1st Cir. 1963). Another example is the so-called "white coat" or doctor theme. 
In American Chicle Co., No. 6791, FTC, April 30, 1958, the Commission stopped the 
practice by prohibiting "the manufacturers of Rolaids from representing 'by use of 
a white coat and any other object, device or word indicative of the medical profes-
sion, that doctors or the medical profession recommend Rolaids, unless the repre-
sentation is limited to numbers of doctors not greater than has been ascertained to 
be the fact.' " 
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nications Commission, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the 
Internal Revenue Service, and the Securities and Exchange C~m-
mission, all have a role in making economic democracy work.64 
Moreover, state legislation, common-law rights and remedies, and non-
governmental regulation by private groups, ·such as the Better Busi-
ness Bureaus, are available to purchasers and honest competitors.6rs 
It is clear, however, that the role of the Commission in combating 
false advertising is singularly significant in rationalizing our eco-
nomic order by providing accurate and honest information with re-
spect to competing goods and services. 
64. Note, supra note 26, at 1038-53. 
65. OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 25, at 280-309. 
